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Economic Growth and Recovery in the 
United States: 1919- 1941 
Alexander J. Field 
12.1 . INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has two main sections and an appendix. The first section provides an 
overview of what lay behind record productivity growth in the US economy between 
1929 and 1941. The second considers the role of rigidities and other negative supply 
conditions in worsening the downturn and slowing recovery. While I argue consist-
ently that the overarching explanation of the Great Depression will and should 
continue to emphasize a collapse and slow revival of the growth of aggregate demand, 
I spend relatively little time on what drives this since these issues are dealt with in 
detail elsewhere in the volume. The chapter instead concentrates on the aggregate 
suppl y side- both the broad array of positive shocks that I argue propelled potential 
and, eventuall y, actual output forward , and the negative conditions which, in inter-
action with aggregate demand, may have increased the size of the output gap and 
prolonged its persistence. An appendix offers detail discussion and updated calcula-
tions of productivity growth rates for the critical period from 1929 to 1941. 
12 .2 . GROWTH AND CYCLES 
Economic growth and business cycles are two of macroeconomists' central con-
cern s. In principle, this should be no less true in studies of the Great Depression. 
Yet for perhaps understandable reasons, the preponderance of academ ic scholar-
ship has focused on the persistent output gap and high unemployment that 
marked the I 930s. In other words, it has focused on cycles. 
This chapter examines the years 1929- 41 in the United States with a focus on the 
growth of actual and potenti al output during this period as well as the expansion 
and contraction of the output gap- the difference between actual and potential.' 
1 Polential output , sometimes referred to as natural o r full employment output, is the highest level 
of oulput sustainable without so stimulating the economy through monetary and/or fi sca l po licy that 
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A princ ipal theme is that potential, and, eventuall y, ac tual output rose very rapidl y 
over th is 12 yea r peri od , a lmost enti rely as the consequence of the growth of tota l 
factor productivity.2 It was this growth that made possible the successful prosecu-
tion of the Second W orld War as well as what Wa lt Rostow (l 960) call ed the age of 
high mass consumption tha t fo ll owed . In o ther words, I a rgue that the infrastruc-
tura l, organ izational, and technological fou ndations of the golden age (1 948- 73) 
were already largely in place by 194 1. Thi s contrasts wit h the standard na rrat ive 
which suggests th at th e war somehow magicall y transfo rmed the doom and 
gloom of the Depression yea rs, so that, like a phoenix rising fro m th e ashes, th e 
US suddenly, in 1948, stands a colossus as tride the world econom y. Given th at 
th e U nited States was involved in th e war fo r less th an four years, with fu ll 
scale war mobil izat io n lasti ng perhaps sixteen months, th is narrative warrants 
re-examination . 
T he Dep ress ion years were d isastrous fro m the standpo int of capacity utiliza-
t ion, and I do not mean to downplay any of thi s. Bank fai lures and fi nancial crisis 
were associated with an 87 per cent decline in real gross p ri va te domes tic in vest-
ment between 1929 and l 932. Construction spending never recove red from its 
1920s peaks un til after th e war. 1929 vehicle prod uctio n was not rea ttained unti l 
1949. The Dow Jones Ind ustr ial Index d ro pped 89 per cent from its August 1929 
peak to its trough in July of 1932, with man y of th e twentieth century's largest one 
day increases occurrin g during th at volati le and sicken ing slide. Rea l GD P de-
cl ined more th an 27 per cent and unemployment rose from 3.2 per cent in 1929 to 
25 per cent in 1933, wh ile consu mptio n decl in ed 18 per cent in rea l term s. Double 
digit unem ployment fo r more than a decade rep resented a terrible waste of human 
and o th er resources, and untold ha rdship fo r th e milli ons o f people out of work.3 
And yet the Depression yea rs were also a trium ph of American ingenuity, 
inve ntiveness, an d hard work. Fuelled by an explosion of resea rch and develop-
ment, government infrast ru cture investment, and crea tive response lo adversity, 
scientific, technological, and o rga n izatio nal advance expanded the capabiliti es-
an accelerat ion of the infl ation rate ensues. Ge nerally speaki ng, wh e n one is below po tential , th at is, in 
the presence of a n output gap, a n increase in no minal inco m e wi ll result mostly in inc reases in output 
and c111ploym ent. As a n econo my approaches potenti al fro 111 below, addit iona l stimulus begi ns to be 
experienced as pri ce increases rather tha n output growth . Wi th labour a nd phys ica l capi tal now in 
sho rt su p pl)', infl at io n accelera tes a nd, in th e face of furth er increase in aggregate dc111and , growt h in 
outpu t a nd em plo)'ment will stall. 
2 Tota l facto r prod uct ivity (TFP) is th e rati o of output to a co111b ined m easure of ca pital and labo u r 
inpu t. Labour produ ctivity, in cont rast, is th e ra tio of ou tput to the nu111 bc r of wo rke rs o r worker hours. 
The growt h ofTFP is th e difference between th e growth of o utp ut an d a weigh ted average of the gnl\\1h 
of inpu ts, with the weights corresponding to the shares of the two fact o rs in nati o nal income. Fo r the 
Depress ion years, the p recise weigh ts do n' t mat ter m uch , beca use nei ther labour nor pri vate sector 
physical capi tal inputs grew noticeably between 1929 and 194 1. Thus, all of th e substa ntial outpu t 
gro\\1h between these years ca n be attribu ted to a n inc rease in tota l fa ctor producti vity . Fo r d etai ls, sec 
Field (20 11: introd uctio n a nd appe ndix ), as wel l as the appendix to thi s chapter. 
1 Investment , co nsumpt io n, a nd o ut put data arc from < h tt p://www.bea.gov> . Natio nal ln co111e 
and Product Accounts, T able 1.1.3, accessed 22 Ja n ua ry 2012. T he un employment dat a arc fro m 
Lebcrgott ( I 964). Const ruct io n data a rc from Carter ct al , (2006) , series Dc262. For the Dow /ones 
Industrial Index , sec: < ht tp: / /s tockcharts.co rn /freccharts/hi sto rical/djia 1920 1940.htm l>. 
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the potential output-of the economy. '1 What I have ca lled the country's Great 
Leap Forward (Field, 20 11 ) helped the United States win the war and set the stage 
fo r a quarter century of post-war prosperity. It is part of the explanation, along 
with wartime destruction in other countri es, for why the US loomed so large in the 
wo rld economy in 1948, and high post-war growth rates in Europe and Japan 
rep resented, in part, catch up lo a fronl"ier that had been pushed out in the Un ited 
Stales during the 1930s (Abra movitz, 1986). 
This expansion in potential and , when demand conditions permitted, actual 
outpu t was fuelled by severa l tributaries. The first was the maturing of a private ly 
funded research and development system that had begun with Thomas Edison in 
Menlo Park, New Jersey. Then, as now, most private sector R&D was conducted in 
manufacturing, and we have good data on activity in thi s sector because of surveys 
conducted by the Na tional Research Council in 1927, 1933, and 1940. R&D 
employment, which stood at 6,274 in 1927 had , by 1933, after fo ur of the wors t 
years of the Depression, climbed to I 0,918. In 1940, after another seven years of 
do uble digit unemployment, that number stood at 27,777. Data on the number of 
labs establi shed, and actual spending, paint a simi lar picture, with particularly 
dra mati c increases after 1935 (Mowery and Rosenberg, 2000: 8 14; Field, 20 I I: 56, 
Table 2.4). 
A second tributary refl ected spill overs from the government funded build out of 
the surface road network. The US produced more than four mi lli on passenger 
vehicles in I 929, a level of production not reached again for twenty yea rs (Carter 
el al. , 2006, se ri es Df343). By the second half of the decade the growth of vehicle 
registrati ons had outrun the capabilities of the road infrastructure. A strong 
political coalition pressed fo r better roads. Farmers wanted them, complaining 
that their French counterparts moved grain at ha lf the cost over a superior 
surfaced road network, whi le American agriculturists faced the eq ui va lent of a 
mud tax. Bicyclists wanted them, car owners and car makers and suppliers to the 
auto industry (plate glass makers, tyre makers, steel makers) wanted them, as did 
the petroleum, asphalt, and motel industries. Truckers wanted them, as did , 
perhaps surpri singly, railroads, which saw themselves as evolving a symbiotic 
relationship with truckers in which they (the railroads) would be the sen ior 
partners (Paxson, 1946; Fi nch, 1992; Goddard, 1994). 
But the locat ion of a nationa l road netwo rk was a contentious business, because 
it wou ld mean (as did the building of the interstates three decades later) the 
making and breaking of many loca l communities. Sta te highway departments had 
to reach agreement with each other and the federal authoriti es over what routes 
wo uld be national. By November of 1926 a treaty had been negoti ated, its terms 
reflected in th e publica ti on of a detai led map showing the proposed US route 
system. The country then started building or improving streets, highwa ys, bridges, 
and tunnels, and if one just looks at the data for such expenditures, it is hard to tell 
that the country had a depress ion (there were moderate declines in spending, 
•
1 The full dimens ions of 1hat expansion we re first app reciated when war planners, in pa rticul a r 
Simon Ku znet s, began , after Pea rl Harbor, to recko n how much guns and butter the US economy co uld 
produce, and were not fully revea led u ntil the massive fiscal a nd m onetary stimulus associated with the 
Seco nd World War closed the remaining output gap. 
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relative to th e late 1920s, in 1933, 1934, and 1935). 5 By 194 1, the US route system 
was complete, and, because of its growth , productivity in transportation (both 
trucking and ra ilroads) as well as wholesale and retail distribution had risen 
dra maticall y (Field, 2006, 2011: chapter 2). 
Finall y, some sectors, like rai lroads, benefited from the kick in th e rea r of 
adversity th at generated creative responses. In the 1920s, ra ilroads had been 
able to solve th eir problems essentially by th rowing money at them. But, in the 
1930s, access to chea p SO-yea r mortgage money dri ed up, and by th e middle of the 
decade roads responsible fo r more than a third of fi rst track mileage were in 
receivership (Schi ffman, 2003). Rati onali zation, including major adva nces in 
fre ight interchange, meant big ga ins in efficiency. Progress toward unlimited 
fre ight interchange began with gauge standardization in the 1880s and continued 
d uring the First Wo rld Wa r when, as troops operated the rail system, th e 
government pressed fo r standardization of equipment and operating procedu res. 
T he US had a national rail network, but it consisted of individual lines owned and 
operated by priva te fi rm s. The questi on of what happened when, fo r example a 
fre ight car went into 'fore ign' ter rito ry had impo rtant economic consequences. 
Was it necessary to break cargo? Could a ca r deli vering outs ide of its system pick 
up a new load fo r the return trip in a competitor's regio n' If locomotives or rolling 
stock broke down, could they be repaired in a fo reign yard? 
Developing unifo rm procedures and tari ffs governing in terline transactions 
allowed huge effic iency ga ins. The number of employees, locomotives, fre ight 
cars, and passenger ca rs each dropped by a quarter or a third between 1929 and 
194 1. Yet revenue freight ton miles in 194 1 were slightly higher th an in 1929, and 
passenger miles were almost as high . These ratios translated into very significant 
productivity gains (Stover, 1997; Field, 2011 : chapter 12, 201 2). 
It is natural to ask, given the coincidence of the greatest economic depression 
and the most rapid productivity growth of the twentieth centu ry, whether th ere is 
a necessary connection between depression and rapid productivity growth. There 
is no simple answer. Much of the coincidence refl ects serendipi ty. A num ber of 
technological paradigms were ripe for explo itation at th e time, and a good deal of 
what happened would have happened without the Depression. If it were true th at 
economic downturns la id the fo undations fo r higher productivity growth in th e 
future, we could console those out of wo rk with th e thought that their sacrifi ces 
were laying the fo undation for a better tomorrow. To argue thus wo uld, however, 
be both cruel and largely unjusti fied, because the response of economic orga niza-
tions to adversity, like that of individuals, varies greatly. Some sectors did respond 
in ways th at generated persisting benefits, and fo r the 1930s the railroad sector is 
th e poster child for this style of argument, providing the best support fo r Richard 
Posner's suggesti on that depressions may have a silver lining (Posner, 2009). 
T here is anecdotal evidence that this dynamic may also have affected parts of 
the manufac tu ring sector.6 
; Sec Ca rt er ct al. (2006), ser ies Dc37 l. 
6 
' in the auto mobile industry parti cu larl y, but in other ma nufactu ring industri es as well, improve-
m ent s in p lant layout appear to have been greatly stimulated by the depress io n, with resultin g better 
cont inui ty of the flow of work and savings in direct and supervisory labo r, eq uipment , fl oo r space, and 
inventories ' (Wein traub, 1939: 26) . 
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Technological change during the 1930s involved both product and process 
innovations: th e development, introductio n, and refinement of dramatic new 
products, as well as more mundane changes in how th ey were made or se rvices 
delivered, that cumulatively and in th e aggregate made a big difference. Some 
Depression era adva nce in volved refi nements of products alread y ava il able in th e 
1920s (automobiles and mechanical refri gerato rs are examples). In oth er instances 
(nylon a case in point), entirely new materials and products made from them were 
both developed and ro ll ed out durin g the Depression yea rs. Finally, resea rch and 
development restocked the larder for the post-wa r period, by replenishing th e 
storehouse of only partially or minimall y exploited innovati ons, such as television. 
Jn the latter catego ry, Philo T. Farnsworth's development of what would be the 
signature new consumer product of the post-war period was financed during the 
1930s by San Francisco venture ca pital. After a length y patent dispute, in wh ich 
Farnsworth preva iled, television was introduced to the public by RCA at the 1939- 40 
New York World's Fai r, at the same time as commercial broadcasts began. Although 
production and diffusion was interrupted by the war, take- up was extremely rapid 
beginning in the late 1940s, as is typical for new entertainment as opposed to labour 
saving consumer appliances (Bowden and Offer, 1994; Field, 2010b). 
Adva nces in aeronautica l innova tion impacted a nascent indust ry during the 
Depression at the same time as they la id th e foundation for war production as well 
as th e post-war aviation secto r. In 1936, Donald Douglas introduced th e DC3-
arguably th e world 's most famous and successfu l aircraft (it had a starrin g role in 
the closing scenes of the movie Casablanca, alongside Humphrey Bogart and 
Claude Rains). Over 16,000 were produced, including over 10,000 C-47s- a 
military version with strength ened floor and ca rgo doors, built during the war. 
Seve ral hundred are still in operation. A refl ection of the state of aero nauti ca l 
advance durin g the 1930s (as well as the relatively sho rt period of US in volvement 
in the wa r) is thi s: all US aircraft that saw major service operation in World War 
Two were already on the drawing boa rds ('substantiall y designed') in December of 
194 1 (Galbraith , 1967: 22). 
Other products, developed and ro lled out during the Depression, ach ieved high 
penetration before th e war began. In 1928 the DuPont Corpora tion lured Wallace 
Ca ruthers away from hi s labora tory at Harvard to Delawa re, where he began to 
develop blockbuster new materia ls including neop rene and nylon. The company 
introduced nylon stockin gs to a ravenous female populati on on 15 May 1940, 
selling almost 5 million pairs th e first day, and 63 milli on pairs th e first year, 
befo re production was diverted towards pa rachutes and mosquito netting for the 
Pacific campaigns. Ca ruth ers unfortuna tely did not live to see any of thi s. 
Suffering from depress ion of a different kind, he committed suicide in 1937 
(Hermes, 1996). 
The 1930s also saw major refin ement of products already ava il able to a limited 
audi ence in the 1920s. Durin g the 1930s, mechani cal refri gerators m oved from a 
'bleedin g edge' product to a mass production and mass consumption item. In the 
1920s, if you asked members of an Ameri can household whether they had 
refrigerati on, and they answered affirmatively, it usually meant they had an 
icebox- litera lly. A huge infrast ru cture supported an industry that cut fro zen 
water from northern lakes and ponds during the winter, stored the product in 
insulated warehouses, and distributed it throughout the year. 
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Entrepreneurs commerciali zed two systems of mechanica l refri gerati on for 
homes during the I 920s. The first, powered by gas, s ilent and in volving no moving 
parts, was a rguably the superi o r technology (the Servel Corporation continued to 
manufacture these into th e 1950s). The other, whose descendants cool our food 
today, in volved mechanical compresso rs driven by an electri c moto r. Electric 
utiliti es were in volved in marketin g the new product, and favo ured th e latter 
technology. But th ey did not push home refri geratio n hard unti l the I 930s. 
Durin g th e 1920s, both types of refrigerators were boutique products, produced 
by hundreds of sma ll companies, and achieving low penetration. The appliances 
were prone to breakdown and required a grea t deal of afte r sa les service. Although 
mechanica l refrigeration was ava il able, by the end of the decade, it was in use in 
on ly a small frac tion , perh aps 3 per cent, of American households (Tobey, 1996: 
17- 19). 
In additi on to questi ons o f reliability, the sta te of wiring in Ameri ca n house-
holds placed se rious obstacles to diffusion. By th e end of the 1920s a large fraction 
of urban US ho useholds were 'electrifi ed '. What th is typicall y mea nt, however, was 
that the re was one light fi xture in the ceiling of each room and perh aps one wa ll o r 
'utility' outl et per room . The outl ets and th e elect rical feed co uld handle a fl oo r 
lamp or a small radio, but th e heavier loads demanded by refr ige rato rs o r washing 
mac hines would almost certainl y blow a fuse. 
By 194 1, many houses had upgraded wiring, mechanica l refri gerato rs were 
mu ch more reliable, and with experi ence and mass production , th eir cost had 
come down. By 1940, 44 per cent of US households had mecha ni cal refri ge ration: 
56 per cent of urban households, 39 per cent of rural non-fa rm households, and 
15 per cent of fa rm households (US Bureau of th e Census Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1948: 813, Table 9 I 4). Thi s diffu sion is a concrete manifestatio n of 
the fact that if you kept your job during th e Depression, your real hourly wages 
went up, and qu ite dramati call y, rising at a rate equal to o r exceed ing what 
occurred in the post-wa r period. 
In contra st with mechani ca l refrigerato rs, automobil es had achieved mass 
market sta tus in th e 1920s, with registrations increasing from 6.7 millio n to 23. 1 
million over th e decade. Because of the Dep ress ion and the wa r, ca r production 
di d not reattain its 1929 peak until I 949. US ca r makers neverth eless produced 
33.3 milli on passenger vehicl es during the twelve yea rs of th e Depression ( 1930-
4 1 inclusive), sli ghtl y more than the 32.7 million manufactured during the eleven 
yea rs 19 19- 29. Registrat ions grew by 6.5 milli on (Carter et al., 2006: se ries Df340, 
Df343). Stated a no th er way, th ere was enough automob il e production during th e 
Depress ion to replace every ca r registered in 1929 at leas t once, as well as add 
millions to the stock of those on the road by th e time the war bega n. 
And the cars were much improved . Radios, heaters, and four wheel hydrau lic 
brakes were now standard. Automati c transmission , power stee ring, and more 
powerfu l engines became options. Tyres moved from th e na rrow profile high 
pressure products of th e I 920s- refl ecting the birth of th e automobile in the 
bicycle industry- to the low pressure ba ll oon tyres upon which most of us ro ll 
today. Vehicl es were strea mlined and more aerodynamic, with headlights and 
trunks (boots) inco rporated into th e body rather than add -ons. Raff and T rach-
tenberg ( 1997) see th e decade of th e 1930s as th e las t in whi ch major innovations 
in veh icl e design took place. 
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Although the absolute numbers were smaller, the percentage increase in truck 
and bus production and registrations was even larger. Truck registrations grew 
from 3.5 million in 1929 to 5.2 million in 1941, and bus registrations almost 
quadrupled, from 34,000 in 1929 to 120,000 in 1941. Combined truck and bus 
production between 1929 and 1941 inclusive totalled 7.5 million, as compared 
with 4.9 million between 1919 and 1929 inclusive (Carter et al., 2006: series Df34 l, 
Df342, and Df345). As was the case for automobiles, there was enough production 
during the Depression to replace every truck and bus on the road in 1929 at least 
once, and add millions more to the transportation system. These newer vehicles 
were, on average, larger, more powerful, and more reliable. 
Although perhaps less visible to the consumer, the 1930s were also a great age of 
process and materials innovations. There were big improvements in thermal 
efficiency, as well as gains based on the exploitation of square-cube relationships 
in the construction of, for example, larger boilers. In 1941, US output of electricity 
was 87 per cent above its 1929 level, driven largely by improvements in product-
ivity, as well as government expansion of hydropower. The bulk of the industry, 
however, relied then, as it does today, on fossil fuel to drive steam turbines. Here, 
topping techniques used the steam from high pressure boilers to heat lower 
pressure boilers. Topping raised capacity by 40 to 90 per cent with no increase 
in fuel costs or labour. More generally, throughout industry, exhaust gasses from 
stacks were used to preheat air to improve combustion, preheat materials for 
subsequent fabrication, or generate steam (Weintraub, 1939: 20). 
Improvements in thermal efficiency also benefited from attention to low cost, 
but often high payoff, investments in insulation. Similarly, modest investments in 
instrumentation yielded big efficiency gains, facilitating automatic process con-
trol, which lengthened the life of equipment, and reduced downtime and main-
tenance costs. The cost of instruments was often trivial compared to the 
improvements in capital and labour productivity they enabled. In the 1920s, 
cracking units in petroleum refining needed to be cleaned every four to five 
days. Instrumentation cut this to every one or two months. Hand controlled 
boilers required rebricking every three months; instrument controls eliminated 
the need to do so entirely. Engineers and chemists also made great progress in 
finding new uses for solid and liquid by-products, thus performing the alchemy of 
turning industrial excrement into gold. 
Machinery became larger, which often resulted in scale economies. Industrial 
locomotives sold between 1932 and 1936 averaged 11.4 tons, versus 7.4 tons 
between 1924 and 1927. The capacity of a power shovel rose from 1.73 cubic 
yards in 1920-23, to 1.90 in 1924- 27, to 2.51 in 1928-31, to 3.28 cubic yards in 
1932-36. Square-cube relationships meant that capital and operating costs per 
unit of output dropped when capacity increased. This dynamic could also be 
observed in electric power generating units as well as in the spiral conveyer screws 
used to move materials in flour mills (Weintraub, 1939: 17). 
Advances in chemical engineering and the use of new materials made contri-
butions as well. Better treatments extended the Life of wooden railroad ties from 
eight to twenty years. Quick drying lacquers reduced the time needed to paint a 
car from more than three weeks in the early 1920s to a few hours, with consequent 
reductions in inventory costs. Stainless steel reduced oxidization on railway cars, 
while chrome plating lengthened the lives of tools and moving parts. Carbon steel 
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blades had to be removed and resharpened after cutting 60 feet of plastic. 
A tungsten ca rbon all oy blade could cut I 0,000 fee t without refi ttin g. Subst ituting 
plast ics fo r wood or metal parts saved in fu el, fab ri cation, and cap ital cos ts 
(Wei ntraub, 1939: 21, 23). 
The 1930s also saw the tail end of the revolution in factory layo ut and des ign 
that had prod uced such ex traordi nary TFP ga ins in manufacturing between 19 19 
and l 929 (over 5 per cent per yea r). That revolution in volved replac ing systems 
fo r distr ibuting powe r internall y within a factory . Nin eteen th -centu ry systems 
were mechanica l, relying on leather belts and mechanica l shaf1s and gea rs to move 
power from a prime mover, usua ll y eith er a steam engine or a water wheel. The 
ca nonical nineteenth -century brick facto ry building was fou r or fi ve sto ri es tall. 
Multi -story buildings represented an engineering solution to the prob lem, given 
the energy losses from fricti on in mechanica l power distribution, of minimizing 
the sum of runs from the central power source. Si nce many of the new fac tory 
towns were on greenfi eld sites, bu ildi ng up was rarely di ctated by high land valu es. 
In a process that ga thered momentum in the second decade of the twentieth 
century, and continued at an acce lerated pace during the l 920s , businesses 
replaced mechanica l systems with networks of electri ca l wire and sma ll individual 
electric motors. The transiti on removed a straightjacket from fac tory design . 
Twentieth -century factories are typica ll y one or two stories, with skylights to 
improve li ghting and ventilat ion, as well as overhead sys tems fo r moving sub-
assemb lies or power tools. Even without a new building, ripping out the shaft s and 
belts produced immediate and large ga ins. Under the old system there was prime 
real estate directl y under the shafts- but much of the rest of the fl oo r space was 
low va lue- used for storage or otherwise wasted. With electric wiring and small 
electric motors, space cou ld be used much more effic ientl y ( Field , 2011: chapter 2; 
Devine, 1983). And freed fina ll y from the dirt , grime, and lu brica ting o il s dripping 
from overhead shafts, factori es could become much cleane r. 
Ry 1929, ro ughl y three-quarters of US industria l capac it y had already expe ri -
enced this transition,7 with results refl ected in strong TFP growth ac ross all two 
digit manufacturing industri es (F ield, 20 1 I: 52- 3, Table 2.2). This tra nsition could 
propel manufacturing TFP to permanen tl y higher levels but , as the Solow growth 
model reminds us, could not permanently in crease growth rat es. Still , as the 1930s 
began, there was some juice left in this fruit. ln 1933, fo r example, Cadill ac 
consolidated production of drive trains from fo ur floors onto one, leaving the 
other three available for other uses. In 1934, Packard cut in half its floor space 
Within ma nufactur ing, elec tric motor horsq,owe r more than doubled between 19 19 and 1929, 
fro m 15.6 13 mil lion in 1919 lo 33 .844 million, and increased furth er lo 45.29 1 mil lion in 1939 (this 
includes motors dri ven by purchased cleclricit y as well as those that used eleclricil y generated onsit e) . 
Other power used directl y in producti on in 1929 incl uded 9.157 million horsepower from steam 
engi nes, 1.203 million from internal combusti on engines, and 1.557 mill ion fro m hyd ro lurbines and 
wate r wheels. Manufacturing also ex ploit ed 7.410 111illion of steam tu rbine horsepower, but most of this 
was probably used for onsite generation of electri ci ty rather than directl y in the production of moti ve 
power. Bringing these numbers together, we can conclude that, in 1929, 33.844 million out of a total of 
45.76 1 million horsepower used d irectl y to produce motive power (74 per cent ) was pro,·idcd by 
electri c motors. This slightl y underestimates th at share since most of the hydroturbines (included in the 
data with wat er whee ls) were probabl y al so used fo r onsite electri city generation rather than directl y for 
111 otive power (US Bureau of the Census, Sta tistical /\li st m et o( th e United Stat es, /94 8: 828, Table ':12 7). 
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requirements per unit of output, freeing an entire building, and similar improve-
ments were reported by Westinghouse and Western Electric. And by rearranging 
machinery in a linear pattern and changing the way materials were handled, the 
textile industry garnered high rates of productivity growth during a period in 
which spinning and weaving technology remained largely unchanged. In other 
industries, electrically driven conveyer belts saved labour, but also saved capital 
through the elimination of waste, reduction of spoilage, and shortening of time in 
process (Weintraub, 1939: 24-25). 
Nevertheless, as the gains in manufacturing from this source waned, TFP 
growth in the sector would inevitably weaken. And indeed, manufacturing TFP 
growth declined by almost half, comparing 1929-41 with 1919-29, although 
remaining world class by any standard of comparison other than the 1920s 
(Field, 2011: 54, Table 2.3). An important question is what kept it from falling 
further. The answer is to be found in the remarkable development of a privately 
funded R&D system, some of whose contributions we have already discussed. 
In the 1920s, almost all (about four-fifths) of the 2 per cent per year TFP growth 
in the private non-farm economy is attributable to the 5 per cent per year sectoral 
growth in manufacturing (Field, 2011: 69 Table 2.10). It is true that the manufac-
turing share of national income grew in the 1930s, but since its TFP growth rate 
was declining, it is obvious that the explanation for a higher private non-farm 
economy (PNE) TFP growth rate in the 1930s must be found in part in other 
secto rs. 
The other major source, as noted, was spillovers in transportation and distri-
bution resulting from the build-out of the su rface road network. High rates of 
productivity growth in trucking, railroad transportation, and trade, weighted by 
their sectoral shares, in the aggregate made a contribution to PNE TFP growth in 
the 1930s roughly equal in magnitude to that of manufacturing. Railway product-
ivity soared, in part because of institutional and organizational changes involving 
freight interchange, but also because the paving and extension of the road network 
solved a critical peak load problem that had plagued the system in prior decades. 
Railways depended on surface roads to move merchandise the final mile to 
households, but many of these roads were impassable because of snow or mud 
during much of the yea r. Thus, the demand for freight cars exceeded capacity for 
four months of the year, while the system had to carry excess capacity for the 
remainder. Road improvements largely solved this problem. The developing 
symbiotic relationship with the flexible and rapidly growing trucking system 
meant that rai lways performed much better in the Second as opposed to the 
First World War, when they were taken over and operated by government troops. 
Another contributor to better performance during 1941-45 was that it was a two 
front war-in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic-thus solving the backhaul (east to 
west) problem that had bedevilled the system in 1917 and 1918. The trucking 
industry, in turn, grew very rapidly, experiencing high rates of productivity 
advance. Together, these improvements allowed big gains in efficiency in whole-
sale and retail trade (Goddard, 1994; Field, 2003, 20 11: chapter 2). 
By 1941 , the US route system was complete, and the beginnings of a network of 
controlled access highways could be seen in the Pennsylvania Turnpike and the 
Pasadena Freeway. Although the almost exclusively two lane US route system 
would eventually be overshadowed by the Interstate system begun fifteen years 
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later, at the time the US system represented a huge improvement over what it 
replaced, both in the engineering standards to which it was built and in the simple 
fact, in many parts of the country, that it was paved. 
These developments, and others like them, underlie what we see in aggregate 
measures of output and productivity. A rough measure of the technological and 
organiza tional progressivity of an era is how much more rapidly output grows 
than a weighted average of the growth of labour and physical capital (structures 
and equipment). That difference, or residual, represents the growth of total 
factor productivi ty. The basic arithmetic of growth accounting over the twelve 
years of the Depression is fa irly simple. In the PNE, which excludes agriculture 
and government but covers almost everything else-about three-quarters of 
GDP-labour hours grew not at all between 1929 and 1941, and the private sector 
capital stock remained also, in the aggregate, basica]]y unchanged. Yet real output 
in 1941 was between 33 and 38 per cent higher (the di fference depends upon 
whether or not we use the newer chained index estimates of output-see the 
appendix). The result is a TFP growth rate of between 2.3 and 2.5 per cent per year 
in the PNE. 
These ra tes of increase are before a cyclical adjustment. Since at least the end of 
the nineteenth century, TFP growth has been pro-cyclical, which means it tends to 
fa ll when the output gap rises, and increases as a recession ends (Field, 2010a). 
Idea]]y, to abstract from these cyclical influences, we would measure from busi-
ness cycle peak to business cycle peak. This is not entirely possible fo r the 
Depression because, although 1929 can be considered a peak, the unemployment 
ra te in 194 1 was still 9.9 per cent. If we use chained index estimates of output, and 
make a cyclical adjustment as described in the appendix, both TFP and labour 
p roductivity growth approach 3 per cent per year across the Depression years. 
Since private sector input growth was effectively absent, all of the growth in 
output was on account of TFP advance. And since there was virtually no capital 
deepening, almost all of the growth in output per hour (labour productivity) can 
also be attributed to TFP growth. 
Output growth in the vicini ty of 3 per cent per year between 1929 and 1941 is 
not, per se, unusual. The long run 'speed limit' for the US since at least the end of 
the Civil War has been a little over 3 per cent per year. But in other periods much 
of that is due to input growth. What is unusual about the Depression experience, 
from a growth accoun ting perspective, is that almost all is attributable to TFP 
advance. 
12.3. THE OUTPUT GAP 
The increase of potential (and, as the output gap closed, actual) output across the 
Depression years was quite high, with most of the gain , especially in the fo rmer, 
driven by record breaking TFP advance. At the same time, the 1930s were 
distinguished by high unemployment and a very poor record of capacity utiliza-
tion, particularly between 1929 and 1933. In this section, I consider three related 
issues. First, the causes of the rising unemployment and sharp decline in output 
between 1929 and 1933. Second, the fa ilure of the output gap to close completely 
368 Alexander J. Field 
Table 12.1. Annual growth rates ofTFP, labo ur, and capi tal p roductivity, private non -farm 
econo my, U nited States, 1869- 20 10, incl uding a cycl ical adjustment fo r 194 1 
TFP Output/ Output/ Adjusted Output/Unit Capital/ 
Hour Hourb Capital Input Labour< 
I 869/78- 1892° l.95 2.36 1.89 0.28 2.08 
1892- 1906 I.II J.66 1.48 0.1 5 I.SI 
1906-1 9 19 1.1 2 1.89 1.63 - 0.16 2.05 
19 19- 1929 2.02 2.27 2.33 1.09 1.1 8 
1929- 194 1 2.97 2.92 2.78 3.56 - 0.63 
194 1- 1948 2.08 2.54 2.32 1.36 1.28 
1948- 1973 1.88 2.75 2.64 0.16 2.59 
1973-1989 0.36 1.28 1.06 - 1.25 2.53 
1989-2000 0.79 2.07 1.57 - 0.91 2.98 
2000-2007 1.40 2.60 2.26 - 0.5 1 3.11 
2007- 2010 0.72 2.72 2. 10 - l.9 1 4.63 
1995-2005 1.46 2.92 2.62 -0.78 3.70 
2005-2010 0.59 2. 15 1.58 - 1.30 3.45 
' Kendrick includes annual index numbers in levels going back to 1889, and then index numbers for the ten year 
periods 1879-88 and 1869-78. One way to calculate growth ra tes leading up to the 1892 business cycle peak would be 
to centre the 1869-78 observation on 1873.5 and sim ply calculate a continuously compounded growt h ra te. This 
yields 2.38 per cent per year. But this esti mate is too high because 1873.5-indeed the whole period of post civil war 
adjustment- is not a business cycle peak, and th is procedure will bias upwards a TFP calculation since we will 
measure from a trough to a business cycle peak. An alternate procedure is to run a regressio n through the logged 
values of 1879- 88 (centred on 1873.5), 1879- 88 (centred on 1883.5), and annual observations from 1889- 1907. This 
returns a trend growth ra te over the ent ire period of 1.59 per cent per year. To be consistent with the estimate of 1.59 
per cent per yea r from 1869- 78 to 1907, we need a trend growth rate of 1.95 per cent per year between 1869- 78 and 
1892. That is, TFP growth of 1.95 per cent fro m 1873.5 to 1892, and I.I I per cent therea fter, is consistent wi th 1.59 
per cent per year over the whole period. 
• Output per adjusted hour uses an hours index that has been augmented to refl ect changes in labo ur quali ty or 
composi tio n. In crea ting this index, di ffe rent categories of labour are weighted by their sectoral wage rates. TFP 
calculations arc made using the adj us ted hours series. For details on the cyclical adjustment fo r 194 1, please see the 
append ix. 
' Rates of capital deepening are approximately equal to the difference between the growth rate of ca pital producti vity 
and the growth rate of labour producti vity. 
Sources: 1869- 1929: Kendrick (196 1, Table A-XX II I). The unadjusted data are from the column headed output per 
man hour, the adj usted data from the column headed output per un it of labour input. Capital Productivity is output 
per unit of capital input. 
I 929- I 948: Sec appendix. 
1948- 1989, Bureau of Labour Statistics, 'Net Multi fac tor Productivity and Costs, I 948- 2002' ( I February 2005). 
1989-20 10: (http: //www.bls.gov) . Data are drawn from the mult ifac tor prod uctivity section of the website, accessed 
on 22 February 20 12. Output per adjusted hour is real value added in the pri va te non-fa rm business sector divided by 
labour input, which includes the compositiona l adjustments. 
until 1942, in spite of strong growth between 1933 and 1937 and agai n between 
1938 and 1941. And fi nally, the causes of the sharp recession of 1937- 38. 
In the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes developed a mordant and compelling 
critique of the then (and again, un til relatively recentl y) dominant view that the 
normal tendency of an economy, free fro m interference from unions, business 
cartels, or government, is toward full employment. If the views against which 
Keynesian thinking was (and sometimes still is) opposed are correct, we do not 
really need the concepts of full employment or an output gap. Employment is 
always, in a sense, 'full ', and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment moot. Lower employment to population ratios can be attributed 
to individuals' dynamic reallocation of labour supply over the li fe cycle. An 
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economy tends automatically to produce at potential, and the only meaningful 
way we can speak of an output gap is as a measure of the difference between what 
the economy is actually producing and what it could produce absent the deleteri-
ous interventions of governments or unions.8 
When the economic downturn began in 2008, the stream of modern macro-
economics developing out of the real business cycle tradition unfortunately had 
very little constructive contribution to policy discussions. Faced with a developing 
financial crisis, and potentially catastrophic decline in aggregate demand, policy 
makers in the United States pulled out their intermediate macroeconomics text-
books, dusted off their IS-LM analysis, and began to calculate how large multi-
pliers might be and what kind of fiscal and monetary stimulus was needed to avoid 
disaster. The experience of countries such as Britain where, ironically, policy-
making was less influenced by Keynesian thinking, and indeed often operated in 
antagonism to its tenets, provides additional evidence that the framework Keynes 
developed for thinking about the performance of an economy in the short run 
remains as relevant as ever. Political constraints limited the size of the fiscal 
response in the United States. These constraints were, however, even more severe 
in Britain, which weathered a downturn whose depth and duration was compara-
tively worse than that in the United States. 
The best overarching explanation for the Depression continues to be that it 
resulted from a collapse and slow revival of aggregate demand. To make this 
argument in its starkest form , we lack a plausible explanation of how potential 
output could have fallen so much between 1929 and 1933. There is little evidence 
that a large fraction of the US labour force decided between 1929 and 1933 
voluntarily to reallocate its labour supply to subsequent years, or that Henry 
Ford suddenly forgot how to run an assembly line, or that a substantial portion 
of the population fell prey to a mysterious virus, or that war destroyed a major 
portion of the country's capital stock. All such hypotheticals would indeed have 
lowered potential output, but nothing remotely comparable occurred during this 
time frame. 
To say that the Depression was principally caused by a decline and then slow 
revival in the growth of nominal income does not, however, preclude attention to 
supply-side conditions with which this interacted. In particular, we can ask to 
what degree obstacles on the supply side may have worsened the downturn or 
provided obstructions to revival, and to what degree these were the consequence 
of government action. 
There is a venerable tradition in macroeconomic and monetary theory focused 
on whether or not money is 'neutral' in the short as well as the long run, that is, 
whether it can have real effects on output and employment. The way the question 
is typically posed reflects acceptance of a key premise in Milton Friedman's 
monetary framework (1971) , the proposition that the demand to hold cash 
8 Writers within this tradition have remained somewhat ambivalent about the rol e of cartels or 
monopolies. Many dismiss their possible effects in limiting output and employment as of little 
empirical significance (Harberger, 1954) , and are therefore sceptical of the value of antitrust policy. 
This attitude seems to soften considerably, however, when, as in the case of the Na tional Industrial 
Recovery Act, it is the government that may be responsible for the carteli zation. In such instances, 
combinations in restraint of trade are seen as quite damaging. 
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(money) is a stable function of a limited number of variables, and moreover, that 
there is little interest elasticity to the demand for money. Friedman's work 
provided much of the intellectual underpinning for attempts by central banks in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s to adopt constant growth rate of the money supply 
rules. 
Such rules, and monetarism as a coherent intellectual philosophy, have been 
largely abandoned today and replaced with an operational emphasis on interest 
rate targeting, influenced by some version of the Taylor rule.9 One of the reasons 
for the demise of monetarism as a guide to policy is that the demand for money or 
near monies has in fact proven to be quite unstable, subject, particularly in times 
of uncertainty or financial instability, to large perturbations based on sudden 
increases in the demand for liquidity, as well as flexibility in the face of changes in 
nominal interest rates. 
A broader and more encompassing way of framing questions of neutrality is to 
ask whether fluctuations in nominal income are neutral in both the short and long 
run. Nominal income (GDP) is the product of real income or output and the GDP 
deflator. It is also arithmetically the product of the stock of money and the income 
velocity of money, with velocity defined as nominal income divided by the money 
stock. The money stock, in turn can be understood as the monetary base (high 
powered money), as Ml, or as whatever aggregate one chooses, as long as income 
velocity is defined in a corresponding manner. 
Nominal income and its growth fluctuate, as Friedman emphasized, because the 
level or growth rates of nominal money change. But they can also fluctuate 
because of changes in velocity, which can be due to perturbations in the demand 
to hold money, or particular forms of cash, as well as changes in fiscal variables 
(government tax and spending programmes) or changes in private sector spend-
ing propensities, especially those associated with the acquisition of investment 
goods (structures or equipment) and consumer durables. 10 Friedman's neutrality 
question, redefined, becomes whether, when for any of the reasons described 
above, nominal income falls, or its rate of growth decelerates, this has real effects 
on output and employment, and, if so, how large they are. Rigidities and/or 
negative changes on the supply side can make a difference in terms of the size 
of such effects. 
Here it can be useful to partition these supply-side conditions into two categor-
ies: those that could in principle be overcome, either temporarily or permanently, 
by reversing the decline or slow growth of nominal income, and those that could 
not. For example, downwardly inflexible wages would not contribute significantly 
to an output decline in the absence of nominal income decline. In contrast, a 
9 The Taylor rul e, developed by John Taylor of Stanford University, attempts to captu re how 
central banks do, and perhaps should, respond to their dual mandates of controlling inflation and 
fostering full employment . Taylor posited that central bankers aspire to 2 per cent inflation (the ideal 
would be no inflation , but given that this is an imperfect business, they prefer a 2 percentage point 
buffer to reduce the likelihood of undershooting, which could yield defl ation - which can also have 
deleterious consequences). Assuming a long run real interest rate of about 2.5 per cent, their base target 
is 4.5 per cent nominal, increased in the presence of higher than desired inflation, decreased in the 
presence of a persisting output gap. 
10 Only when velocity is invariant do questions of monetary and nominal income neutrality become 
the same. 
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negative aggregate supply shock that caused a third of the population and labour 
fo rce to become permanently incapacitated, or a sudden, overnight change in 
workers' preferences in favour of leisure over work, or work five years from now 
versus work this year, could not be overcome, in terms of their effects on real output, 
simply by higher nominal income growth. The problem oflower real output in these 
latter cases would not be that there has been a widening of the outpu t gap, but ra ther 
that potential output had, in a real sense, actually declined. 
In terms of developments in the latter category, however, there is, as noted, no 
smoking gun on the supply side that can explain the rise of the unemployment 
rate from 3.2 per cent in 1929 to 25 per cent in 1933 and the 27 per cent decline in 
real output between these years. This cannot plausibly be attributed to a rise in the 
natural rate of unemployment because of changes in the demographic compos-
ition of the labour fo rce, or increases in the attractiveness of living on the dole, or 
civil war, or some sudden collective amnesia about how to manufacture steel. That 
is why, in discussing the Depression, we talk in terms of an increase in the output 
gap. It is why we describe most of that unemployment as involuntary. 11 And it is 
why we continue to explore the role of changes in spending propensities, liquidity 
shocks, bank fa ilures, inadequate Federal Reserve response, and other factors in 
bringing this about. 
Distingui shing between these categories of supply conditions can matter when 
we move into discussions of proximate and ultimate cause. Suppose, fo r example, 
we believe that Irving Fisher's debt deflation mechanism is important in prolong-
ing depressions. Obviously, without a deflationary impulse, debt defl ation could 
not operate. But equally obviously, that mechanism depends on a system of 
borrowing and lending in which interest payments are fixed in nominal terms. 
In an imagined world of fully indexed debt contracts, the results for the economy 
would differ. In this case, however, it is still appropriate to describe the downturn 
as being caused by the shock to nominal income, not the absence of indexed loan 
contracts. The potential output of the economy would not rise with the introduc-
tion of fully indexed loan contracts (although its vulnerabilities to recessions 
might decline). 
Similarly, if institutional changes have increased the downward inflexibili ty of 
money wages, and output falls in the face of a defl ationary demand shock, it is 
appropriate to say that the output loss has been caused by the demand shock, not 
the absence of a completely flexible nominal wage system in which the spot price 
of labour rose and fell with demand conditions as does the price of wheat. The 
introduction of a regime of more downwardly flexible money wages would not 
11 Thus, while I am broadly sympathetic to many of the conclusions of Hatton and Thomas (201 3) , 
1 find implausible their suggestion that the NA lRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) 
rose 12 percentage points, fro m 4.2 to 16.9 per cent in the US during the Depression. Every period of 
elevated unemployment in the United States has brought fo rth a li teratu re suggesti ng that this has been 
caused by a rise in the NAIRU. For the 1970s see, fo r example, Tobin (1977). I am receptive to the 
argument that the N AIRU may temporarily ri se as the consequence of an economic downturn 
hysteresis due to atrophying of labour market attachment among the long term unemployed. But 
I am sceptical when large increases in the unemployment rate are attributed after the fact to rises in the 
NAlRU, that is, when the causal roles are reversed. 
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mean that the potential output of the economy had actually risen, nor would 
downward inflexibili ties mean that it had fa llen. 12 
In a series of papers, Lee Ohanian (2003, 2009), sometimes in collaboration 
with his co-author, Harold Cole (Cole and Ohanian, 2000, 2002, 2004), has argued 
that government-induced negative supply shocks explain much of the Depres-
sion's depth and duration. Although the specific culprits and particular emphases 
have differed as this research programme has developed, three policies have borne 
the brunt of the blame. First, a meeting organized by President Hoover in 
November of 1929 in which the president encouraged manufacturers to hold 
the line against nominal wage cuts in the face of what was then anticipated as a 
likely recession. Second, the passage in 1933 of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act. And third, the passage of the Wagner Act establishing the National Labour 
Relations Board in 1935, providing a more favourable environment for union 
organizing. 13 
If the Cole and Ohanian papers have a common thread, it is the claim that the 
main explanation for the Depression is not that nominal income was too low, but 
that wages were too high. In particular, they argue, between 1929 and 1933 (or at 
least through 1931), jawboning by Hoover kept nominal wages from falling. After 
1933, New Deal policies not only kept them from falling, but caused them to rise. 
In both instances, policy actions allegedly made the Depression worse. 14 
The evidence indicates, however, that wages were not downwardly inflexible, 
even between 1929 and 1931. In Historical Statistics of the United States, there are 
two main series covering hourly wages during the Depression, one for unskilled 
workers, and one for production workers. Figures 12.l and 12.2 present these, 
along with the CPI (consumer price index), and their ratio, which measures real 
wages. Let us begin with the evidence for unskilled workers. 
Nominal wages fell in 1930, 1931, and 1932, for a total decline of approximately 
18 per cent. Almost all of that loss was recovered between 1933 and 1934, after 
which nominal wages rose modestly before jumping again between 1936 and 
1937. They then grew modestly through 1940, increasing sharply between 1940 
and 1941. While nominal wages fell between 1929 and 1932, output declined 
dramatically, and while nominal wages grew, after 1933, output rose dramatically. 
It is true that the CPI fell further than nominal wages during the worst years of 
the Depression. This meant that if you managed to keep your job and your hours, 
your real standard of living actually improved slightly between 1929 and 1933. 
Real wages then began to rise very sharply after 1933, along with economic 
recovery, as a large output gap began to close. Perhaps the suggestion is that if 
nominal wages had fallen even further, real wages could have declined, and the 
Depression thus avoided. 
12 Except in the sense that even in a dynamic economy with positive but low inflation, the flexibility 
might facilitate sectoral readjustment. 
13 Cole and Ohanian's work is part of a larger body of work intent on blaming recessions on 
government action. Other examples include Jude Wanniski's (1978) attribution of the Depression to 
the Smoot-Hawley tariff, or Robert Higgs' emphasis on the second New Deal, especially the work of the 
Temporary National Economic Committee, often interpreted as hostile to big business, as well as the 
more aggressive enforcemen t of antitrust policy. 
14 l interpret their argument in terms of nominal wages, because that is all an employer can set; real 
wages can only be known after the fact. 
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Fig.12.1. Real hourly wages of unskilled workers, United States, 1929-41 
Sou rces: Carter et al. , 2006: Series Ba4218 and Cc! -2. 
Is this likely? In answering this question, Fisher's analysis is relevant. During 
the seven years of rough CPI constancy between 1922 and 1929, much debt had 
been contracted based on the expectation of continued price stability. When 
prices plummeted between 1929 and 1933, real interest rates on existing and 
newly issued debt soared, even as nominal rates dropped. It is hard to see how a 
more severe deflationary impulse would have ameliorated this dynamic. Indeed, it 
would likely have made it worse. 
Cole and Ohanian are, however, sceptical that the standard explanations of 
nominal income decline- bank failures, the absence of adequate Fed response, 
high real interest rates, and disruptions to the credit machinery- had much to do 
with the downturn. In support of this view, they cite the rise in the loan to output 
ratio between 1929 and 1932 as evidence that loanable funds were actually quite 
abundant during these years (Ohanian, 2003: 1212). 
This, however, misinterprets what was actually happening during a period in 
which prices were falling and hundreds, indeed thousands, of banks were failing. 
Since most loan obligations were fixed in nominal terms, with deflation we would 
expect this ratio to have risen even if there had been no new loans to be had at any 
price after 1929. The numerator would have declined moderately as existing loans 
ran off, but the denominator would likely have been dropping even more rapidly 
(nominal GDP declined 46 per cent between 1929 and 1933). 15 The trend in this 
ratio is simply reflective of the operation of Fisher's debt deflation mechanism: the 
real burden of debt rose with unanticipated deflation. The rise in the burden of 
debt, and the increase in its value for those to whom it was owed, is consistent with 
15 < http://www.bea.gov> , NIPA Table 1. 1.5. 
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the fact that despite loan defaults, bond interest was the only category of income to 
capital to rise between 1929 and 1933 (Field, 2011: 269). 
The data on wages for production workers paint a very similar story. These 
numbers are perhaps even more relevant for the Ohanian argument, since they 
pertain to workers who would presumably have been most affected by restraint on 
the part of the captains of industry upon whom Hoover was, aJlegedly, effectively 
leaning. Here we see nominal wages dropping 10 per cent between 1929 and 1931, 
the period most emphasized in Ohanian 's analysis, and 21 per cent between 1929 
and 1933. 
Neither of these series suggests that nominal wages were downwardly inflexible. 
Ohanian may wish that wages had fallen more, or suspect that absent Hoover, 
they would have fallen more. It is, however, questionable whether a faster rate of 
nominal wage decline would have lessened the cumulative output loss between 
1929 and 1933, particularly in a world of non-indexed loan contracts and interest 
rates that cannot go below zero. There is, moreover, some question whether 
Hoover's jawboning had any significant effect on the course of nominal wages. 
Rose (2010) finds no evidence that industry attendance at the December 1929 
conference affected the timing of reductions in nominal wages. 
With respect to the 1933- 41 period, our analysis can be somewhat more 
nuanced. We can grant the Cole-Ohanian premise that New Deal policies and 
legislation played a role in raising both nominal and real wages. But we should 
also take exception to their characterization of the recovery from 1933 as 'weak' 
(Ohanian, 2003: 1205). Post 1933 recovery, particularly between 1933 and 1937 
(which includes the period of the NRA (National Recovery Administration)) , was 
in fact extraordinarily strong, with rapid rises in output, employment, and income 
to capital as well as labour. The stock market increased by a factor of five from its 
trough in 1932 to its peak in 1937. Growth in real output was also strong from 
1938-41, following the Wagner Act and big increases in unionization, although 
stock market gains were lower. Overall, output, wages, and income to capital all 
grew very rapidly between 1929 and 1941, and particularly between 1933 and 
1941. We should not be surprised by this coincidence, since national income 
accounting identities tell us that the sum of income flows must approximately 
equal the flow of output. 
How exceptional was this growth? In 1937 real output was 43 per cent higher 
than it had been in 1933 (NIP A, Table 1.1.6). Over those four years the economy 
grew at a continuously compounded rate approaching 9 per cent per year. Real 
output in 1941 was 91 per cent higher than in 1933-almost twice as high- a 
continuously compounded rate of growth of 8 per cent per year over a period that 
included the sharp recession of 1937-38. It is of course true that the output gap 
was not finally closed until 1942, which is why Ohanian can use, as evidence of 
weak recovery, the observation that output in 1939 was 'below trend'. 
The proximate cause of recovery after 1933 was revival in the growth of 
aggregate demand; the particular contributors to this are discussed elsewhere in 
this volume. One important factor was the removal of the straightjacket on 
monetary growth resulting from the abandonment of the gold standard. Policy 
measures ended the deflation, allowing real interest rates to decline, and invest-
ment, output, and employment to begin growing again. But backstage, as the 
drama of this revival unfolded, potential output grew by leaps and bounds, 
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Sources: Carter et al. , 2006: Series Ba436 1 and Cc l -2. 
helping to sustain an output gap that did not close completely un til after the US 
entered the war. Its persistence can partly be attributed to supply-side obstacles to 
recovery in sectors such as construction (see below in this section). But it was also 
the case that productivity advance, which reduced the inputs required to produce 
a given output, contributed to slower employment growth. Concerns with tech-
nological unemployment were widespread during the Depression and, although in 
a well managed economy these should not be an issue over the longer run, worries 
about the effects of innovation on job growth had a basis over the short to medium 
term .16 
There is no historical necessity that labour will share, or share proportionately 
in productivity gains. Insti tutions, politics, and culture matter. To take an extreme 
case, in a slave system, improvements will devolve almost entirely to the benefit of 
the owning class. Slave prices may be bid up, perhaps providing some additional 
incentives for better housing, food, and medical care, but most of the gains go to 
the owners. 'Free' labour markets are not all of one ki nd, and can be governed by 
qui te di fferent legal and institutional rules affecting, fo r example, how easy it is fo r 
labour to organize and bargain coll ectively. 
Twentieth-century evidence suggests that there is a range of correspondence 
between wages and productivity- both levels and rates of growth- that can allow 
16 Capital also suffered fro m (or enjoyed) technological unemployment. With strong rises in capital 
productivity, the need fo r (and demand fo r) investment spend ing beyond that needed to replace worn 
out building and equipment was attenuated. Along with the effects of obstacles to renewed res idential 
housing construction, this resulted in increases in gross private domest ic investment that were lower 
than they otherwise might have been. Even after 1933, weak private capital fo rmation hindered, fro m 
the aggregate demand side, a closing of the output gap. 
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fu ll employment, the accumulation of physical and human capital, and healthy 
economic growth. In the I 960s, for example, as governments and companies in 
the United States and Europe dealt with strong organized labour movements, a 
consensus emerged that a workable course of action was to agree-at the national 
level, if possible- that wage gains would rise roughly alongside productivity gains. 
That incomes policy was considered within the realm of political discourse 
testifies to the fact that, under different circumstances, wage gains might or 
might not keep up with productivity gains, or might exceed them. 
Cole and Ohanian do not dispute that productivity rose sharply, particularly 
after 1933. But they emphasize that wages rose fas ter, arguing (2002: 30) that the 
ra tio of wages to productivity between 1929 and 1939 increased in the United 
States by 25 per cent, and implying that the New Deal policies that allowed labour 
to reap a disproportionate share of productivity gains were an impediment to full 
recovery. A look at Figures 12. 1 and 12.2, in conjunction with Table 12.1, does 
indeed show that wages increased even fas ter than measures of productivity. 
But the rise in this ra tio has to be understood in the context of what had 
transpi red in the 1920s. The 1920s were a period of high and rising income 
inequality, leading to levels rivalled only by what we have been experiencing in 
the most recent decade. If we look at the ratio of the real hourly wage of 
production workers to Kendrick's estimate of output per hour in manufacturing 
across the entire interwar period, we place in perspective the increase in the ratio 
to which Cole and Ohanian call our attention (see Figure 12.3). What we see is 
that, in terms of real hourly wages, labour shared hardly at all in the very large 
productivity gains in manufacturing during the 1920s. Workers did benefit from 
relatively full employment, which sustai ned household income, and increased 
opportuni ties for buying on credit allowed consumption to rise. It is nevertheless 
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fair to say that capital reaped almost all of the gains from productivity growth 
in the 1920s. 
This underscores the political dimension of Hoover's November 1929 meeting. 
A concern about labour peace was understandable, since the insult of widespread 
unemployment was about to be added to the injury of having received in the 
1920s, in the form of increments to real hourly wages, a very small share of the 
preceding decade's productivity gains. This was understood at the time, if not 
precisely in these terms. As Hoover argued in 193 1, ' [w]ages during Prosperity 
went nowhere near so high, comparatively, as commodity prices, business profits 
and dividends; therefore they should not come down with the general decline' 
(Time, 13 April 1931 , cited in Ohanian, 2009: 16). Following a decade in which 
labour reaped virtually none of the gains from prosperi ty, the economy in 1929 
was poised to go into a devastating depression, in spite of wages then prevailing 
that were low in comparison with what they would have been had labour shared in 
the 1920s gains. Cole and Ghanian's criticism seems to be that Hoover did not do 
more to insure that real wages declined even further relative to productivity levels. 
Before leaving Cole and Ohanian, it is worth mentioning a notable paper that 
recently appeared in the Journal of Economic History, because it goes to the heart 
of the real business cycle approach that informs their work. InkJaar et al. (2011 ) 
apply a methodology pioneered by Basu et al. (2006) which extracts from the 
Solow productivity measures that portion due to systematic pro-cyclicality. Be-
cause of the inabili ty of the private sector as a whole to get rid of physical capital in 
a downturn, and thus avoid ongoing depreciation and holding costs, the economy 
tends to experience short run increasing returns to scale as the output gap closes 
(see Field, 2010a). 17 This is different from saying that the economy is subject to 
long run increas ing returns to scale. What it means is that, while TFP really does 
go down (or experiences a reduced rate of growth ) during a recession, this is not 
because of technological regress. 
If we 'purify' measures of TFP by removing these cyclical effects, we can then 
test whether there is any discernible short run relationship between purified TFP 
and input levels, a key prediction of the REC approach. InkJaar et al. (20 11 ) show 
that for US manufacturing between 1919 and 1939 there is none. Their work is 
consistent with the view that the pro-cyclicali ty of TFP is principally driven by 
aggregate demand fluctuations, which, as one goes into recession, cause decl ines 
in output that are greater than the reduction of inputs, especially those associated 
with physical capital, particularly structures. By and large, observed TFP pro-
cyclicality is the consequence of business cycles, not their cause. 
Although it is doubtful that Hoover's and Roosevelt's labour market policies 
were responsible for much of the Depression, there were supply-side problems 
standing in the way of full recovery. Perhaps most important was the legacy of 
premature subdivision and fractionated land ownership that resulted fro m the 
17 Voluntary labour hoarding is the more typ ical explanation for pro-cylical productivity. It is 
clea rly relevant in some instances-particularly in early stages of a downturn where it may not be clear 
how long the recession will last. But l question the persistence and generality of the phenomenon, 
emphasizing instead the involuntary dynamic with respect to physical capital as the more funda mental 
and general cause. See also Field (20 I Oc). 
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uncontrolled land boom of the 1920s. I discuss the details of this at length in Field 
(1992); see also Field (2011: chapter 11). Neither commercial nor residential 
construction reattained its 1920s peaks until after the war, although commercial 
came back somewhat more robustly than residential. The slow revival of com-
mercial construction is partly attributable to capital saving innovation that made 
more efficient use of floor space, particularly in manufacturing. The obstacles to 
increased residential construction were different. They included large transactions 
costs associated with tracking down owners of record, clearing up tax liens, and 
paying mortgage obligations on properties comprising failed 1920s subdivisions, 
many of which had been poorly designed from the standpoint of automobile 
transportation. 18 If we are searching for supply-side obstacles to full employment, 
their contribution to the coll apse and slow revival of spending on residential 
construction is a stronger candidate. 
The idea that construction held the key to understanding incomplete recovery 
is not novel, and was widely shared by economists both before and after the war. 
As Kenneth Roose, writing in 1954, said, 
.. . many believed construction bore a heavy responsibility for the low level of 
economic activity in the 1930s. This belief was held by analysts with widely differing 
theoretical approaches to the recession and business fluctuations in general. Thus the 
National City Bank of New York, The Economist, and [Alvin] Hansen attached 
importance to the weakness of the building industry . .. [Hansen] concluded "It is in 
this area that one finds the explanation for the incomplete recovery of the thirties" 
(1954: 14). 
In Field (2011: 271), I calculate that the low level of residential and, to a lesser 
degree, non-residential construction spending relative to a 1920s baseline was 
responsible for approximately half of the output gap remaining at the local peak in 
1937. Had potential output grown at its long term rate of approximately 3 per cent 
per year, it would have increased from $87.2 billion (I take 1929 actual as 
potential) to $1 10.9 billion in 1937 dollars. This can be compared with actual 
1937 output of $91.9 billion; the difference is the output gap. Had residential and 
non-residential construction spending each retained the rough equality with 
equipment spending characteristic of the 1920s, there would have been an add-
itional $5.8 billion of gross private domestic investment in 1937 dollars. 
Based on the ratio of changes in real output to changes in the sum of the 
components of autonomous planned spending, I estimate a multiplier of 1.78 for 
the period 1933 through to 1937 (Field, 2011: 240, Table 10. 1). 19 This additional 
construction spending would, therefore, have brought actual output to $102.2 
billion, bridging roughly half the distance between actual and potential in 1937. 
Had exports and consumer durables been at their 1929 levels, output would have 
been another $2 billion higher, getting us to $104.2 billion. The remainder of the gap 
18 It is the absence of zoning and land use regulation, the result of inadequate rather than excessive 
regulation , that lies at the hea rt of this supply-side legacy of the 1920s for the 1930s. 
19 Keynesian multipliers, to the degree that they estimate the impact of changes in autonomous 
spending on real output and employment, have their greatest relevance when an economy is in 
recession or depression, and there is slack labour and capital available to produce additional outpu t. 
This was surely one of the instances in which we should expect crowding out. 
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could have been closed by an additional injection of less than $4 billion in 
government or private infrastructure or equipment spending. 
The final issue to consider concerns the causes of the sharp recession 
between 1937 and 1938. Here again, the overarching contributor is likely to 
have been a contraction in the growth of nominal income. The role of increases 
in reserve requirements, emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) has 
recently been questioned (Calomiris et al., 2011). Excess reserves were so large 
at the time that even the higher requirements were not binding. Irwin (2011) 
has emphasized the empirical significance of the Treasury's gold sterilization 
policy in restraining the growth of the money supply. But there is a problem 
with this argument. We can agree that absent sterilization, high powered 
money would have grown faster. But if Calomiris et al. are right, and reserve 
requirements were not binding, banks might well simply have held more excess 
reserves. For these reasons, and although its impact has been questioned by 
Romer (1992: 776), fiscal policy seems a better candidate if we are to emphasize 
a role for aggregate demand in explaining the downturn. There can be little 
doubt that comparing 1937 with the previous year, the fiscal posture changed 
from one of expansion associated with veterans' bonus payments, to contrac-
tion, associated with the introduction of payroll taxes to finance the new social 
security system as well as lower government spending on goods and services 
(NIP A, Table 1.1.6). 
That said, other factors were also operative. Joshua Hausman (2011) has argued 
that the traditional emphasis on monetary and fiscal policy short-changes supply-
side factors, in particular those affecting the motor vehicle industry. He notes that 
the coefficient of variation of changes in state-level private non-farm employment 
during the recession of 1937-38 was approximately twice what it was in other 
severe recessions, including 1929- 33 and 2007-09. This was the consequence of 
particularly steep declines in manufacturing employment in states within which 
the auto industry was concentrated, such as Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana. 
Hausman's story is that car production was hit by a negative supply shock in 
the form of the unionization of GM and Chrysler and higher raw material costs, 
leading to price increases in 1938. These increases were anticipated, leading to a 
shift forward of car sales to the 1937 model year at the expense of 1938 model year 
purchases. Motor vehicle and parts sales fell more than a third during this 
recession. 
Christina Romer (1992: 763) raises some doubts about this argument, noting that 
producer prices fell 9.4 per cent. But as Hausman points out, car prices rose, and 
that is where the big employment losses were. Romer also argues that construction 
expenditures fell in late 1937, and that interest rates spiked, suggesting clear 
evidence of monetary tightening. The annual construction data do not seem to be 
consistent with this story. An index of overall construction contracts awarded 
(1923- 25 = 100) rose from 55 in 1936, to 59 in 1937, to 64 in 1938, to 72 in 1939 
(US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1941: 945, 
Table 929). Housing units starts (in thousands) rose from 304.2 in 1936, to 332.4 
in 1937, to 399.3 in 1938 (Carter et al., 2006: Series Dc510). Residential investment, 
which declines in almost all recessions, actually increased slightly across this 
downturn, although of course, as already noted, it remained quite depressed relative 
to what had prevailed in the 1920s, and the monthly data do show some effect of the 
380 Alexander f. Field 
recession.20 Still, the somewhat anomalous behaviour of residential construction 
during the 1937-38 downturn suggests that this was not entirely a garden 
variety recession , such as 1982, in which slowed growth in aggregate demand 
accounted for almost everything. As for interest rates, the annual data show 
declines across the board, comparing 1938 with 1937, rather than the spike 
posited by Romer (Carter et al., 2006: Series Cj 1224 and 1231 ). Nor do the 
monthly data on short term rates show any evidence of monetary stringency in 
the fall of 1937 or winter of 1938 (Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941: 
451, 464, Tables 120, 125). 
Finally, we can mention Robert Higgs's argument that the downturn after 1937 
is attributable to the second New Deal, and Roosevelt's adoption of more vigorous 
antitrust enforcement, the Temporary National Economic Committee hearings, 
and more populist rhetoric (Higgs, 1997). Supposedly owners of capital went on a 
capital strike, refusing to invest because of their dislike of Roosevelt or concerns 
about insecure property rights. There is no doubt that a segment of the electorate 
hated Roosevelt, although there is little evidence their animosity was worse in 
1937 than it had been in 1933. The facts are that owners of capital did much better 
under Roosevelt than they did under Hoover. And, after falling dramatically in 
I 938, real gross private domestic investment in 1939 exceeded 1936 levels, and in 
1940 exceeded the 1937 peak. These data are hardly consistent with the notion of a 
'capital strike' during Roosevelt's second term (USDC, NIPA, Table 1.1.6). And 
again, the biggest shortfalls remained in residential construction spending. One 
might have expected the effect of regime uncertainty, or Roosevelt hatred, to have 
been more apparent, for example, in producer durables spending. 
Higgs and Ohanian are, of course, part of a continuing tradition aimed at fixing 
the responsibility for business cycles on government. That tradition includes Jude 
Wanniski's 1978 attempt to attribute the Great Depression entirely to the passage 
of the Smoot- Hawley tariff. The unifying theme in this literature is that depres-
sions are the result of government intervention in the workings of the 'free market' 
system. There is no doubt that some of the policies discussed did have the 
potential to generate efficiency losses. But arguments that might make sense if 
economies always operated at potential often cease to hold in a world where 
output gaps are a real and continuing problem. In Economics 1, students are 
taught that there's no such thing as a free lunch, that everything has an opportun-
ity cost, that if you want more guns you have to have less butter. Such pieties 
simply do not apply when, in a recession, one is operating well within the 
production possibility frontier. 
Thus, in principle, David Ricardo was right: tariffs reduce global welfare and 
output by impeding the international division of labour. But in a world of slack 
resources, such damage may be small, and by redirecting purchasing power 
towards import competing domestic producers, tariffs during recessions may 
actually have a mildly stimulative effect (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985). And 
whereas the theory of monopoly suggests that the policies of the NRA, which 
20 Monthly data on the value of construction contracts awarded in 37 states suggest a roughly half 
yea r slowdown running from September of 1927 through to February 1938 (US Bureau of the Census 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1941: 945 Table 928). 
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encouraged ca rtelization and wage and price increases, could have reduced output 
and damaged consumer welfa re, in the presence of defl ation and large scale 
unem ployment they may have done the reverse, by helping to break the back of 
deflationary expectations (Eggertsson, 2008) . 
Finally, note that while Cole and Ohanian attack the NRA fo r fostering 
monopoly, Higgs criticizes the second New Deal for trying aggressively to restrict 
it. One can either take the view that the effi ciency losses from monopoly are small, 
in which case one might conclude that the concerns about the NJRA are mis-
placed, or one can take the opposite view, which would undercut Higgs' position. 
But one cannot consistently endorse both Higgs and Ohanian unless one believes 
that the fos tering of monopoli es is necessarily damaging when done by govern -
ments but not so when done by private enterprise. 
The facts of economic performance in the United States between 1929 and 194 1 
have not changed, but many of the same issues continue to be relitigated in the 
literature. Much of the 'new' focus on negative government-induced supply 
shocks represents an attempt to refocus attention away from the gap between 
actual and potential output and towards effici ency losses associated with different 
kinds of government intervention. In 1977, James Tobin , surveying a related set of 
arguments concerning economic policy and performance in the 1970s, opined 
that '[ i]t takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap' (Tobin, 1977: 
468). Tobin meant that the welfare losses from tariffs, taxes, and other govern-
ment regulations were often small compared to those associated with operating an 
economy below capacity in the case of the Depression fo r more than a decade. 
12.4. CONCLU SIO N 
Although our emphasis in understanding the depth and duration of the Depres-
sion will and should continue to be on aggregate demand, more attention to 
aggregate supply is welcome and overdue. The dominant story here is of a broad 
array of positive shocks that caused potential, and, as the output gap closed, actual, 
output to grow rapidly between 1929 and 1941. In contrast, research associated 
with the real business cycle tradition has emphasized negative shocks resulting 
from deleterious actions by government and unions. These, it is argued, help 
account for the duration of the downturn. Although the Flint sit down strike and 
other labour disturbances likely played a role in the decline of output and 
employment during the 1937-38 recession, the influence of labour policy in 
prolonging the Depression has been exaggerated. Much of what happened recti-
fied in part the unbalanced distribution of gains from productivity growth during 
the I 920s. The resulting moderation in inequali ty, which became especially 
apparent after the war, persisted th rough the I 970s and, as the post-war experi -
ence suggests, should not have posed an obstacle to full recovery in the late 1930s 
had there been adequate growth in nominal income. Obstacles on the supply side 
did play a role, but the impediments to the revival of residential construction, 
refl ecting the hangover from the I 920s boom, were more important. 
W hat lessons can we draw fo r the twenty first century? From the standpoint of 
long run growth the most compelling question is whether there is necessarily a 
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silver lining to recession in the form of a productivity windfall. It is a question, 
unfortunately, without a clear answer. Productivity growth was unusually strong 
across the worst downturn in US experience, but this coincidence was in part an 
historical accident. Preliminary data indicate modest TFP growth from 2005 or 
2007 up through 2010, although labour productivity growth after 2007 has been 
stronger (see Table 12.1). These data are, however, subject to revision, and we do 
not yet know how much of this may reflect cyclical influences. Part of the more 
robust growth in output per hour is the consequence of a rapid rise in the capital-
labour ratio attributable to slow employment growth. As the output gap closes 
labour productivity growth may experience retardation unless compensated for by 
strong TFP advance. Even in the event the longer term TFP trajectory turns out to 
be favourable, it will be difficult to assess whether much or any of it can be 
attributed to the recession per se. 
Considering shorter term supply-side effects, in both instances legacies from 
the boom retarded recovery, and in both instances construction was implicated. 
But the mechanisms differed. In post-war housing booms, including the saving 
and loan boomlet of the late 1980s as well as the more severe cycle of the 2000s, 
zoning and land use regulation ameliorated the problems of premature subdiv-
ision, without, of course, preventing overbuilding. Thus, the physical and some of 
the legal obstacles to recovery are today less severe than they were during the 
Depression, a positive contribution of government regulation, albeit at the local 
level, to macroeconomic stability. This contribution was offset, nevertheless, by 
the deterioration of effective regulatory efforts in the financial sector, and the 
financial wreckage from the prior construction boom remains worse in the 2010s 
than it was in the 1930s, which suffered more from the legacy of a highly leveraged 
stock market boom (see Field, 2011: chapter 10, 2013). 
This chapter has focused attention largely on the supply side. As far as 
aggregate demand is concerned it is fair to say that, in both instances, the 
cumulative output gap could have been less had more aggressive government 
action counteracted the persisting shortfalls in nominal income growth resulting 
from weak private investment spending, as well, to a lesser degree, from cutbacks 
in household spending on consumer durables. Monetary policy, at least subse-
quent to 2008, gets better marks in the more recent episode than during the 
Depression, although fiscal policy stimulus, particularly on the expenditure side, 
could have been stronger in both instances. The rapid closing of the remaining 
output gap in 1942 makes this point effectively for the Great Depression. And 
contrary to political claims that the 2009 stimulus programme (the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act) did not work, its main defect was simply that it 
was too small. Without it, the unemployment rate would have been as much as 
two percentage points higher.2 1 
2 1 Congressional Budget Office, 2011. A larger stimulus might have devoted more funds to 
revenue sharing with state and local governments, which faced plummeting tax revenues on 
account of the downturn , without much of an option of running deficits. While real federal 
spending increased 14 per cent between 2007.4 and 2011.4, real state and local spending fell 7 
per cent over the same period (NIPA Table 1.1.6, accessed 21 February 2012). Because state and 
local spending was higher in the aggregate than federal spending on goods and services 
(74 per cent higher in 2007.4), these changes were largely although not entirely offsetting. 
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This appendix describes the calculations underlying the Table 12.1 productivity 
estimates for the US PNE over the intervals 1929- 41 and 1941 - 48. The raw 
materials are series on output, capital, and hours. In calculations in Field (2011) 
and earlier work, all three of these series are drawn from Kendrick (1961 ). The 
updated numbers reported in this chapter are based on newer series for output 
and capital and show stronger gains in productivity growth for these periods than 
those reported earlier. The output series is based on the latest chained index 
estimates from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIP A) tables pro-
vided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). This series grows more rapidly 
than that used by Kendrick, and is the principal reason the productivity growth 
rates reported here are higher. The capital stock series is drawn from the fixed 
asset portion of the BEA website, and differs slightly from what Kendrick used. 
The labour hours series is the same as that used by Kendrick in 1961 ; it has not 
been updated in the half century since he published. 
The substitution of the newer output and capital series yields an unadjusted 
PNE TFP growth rate of2.54 per cent per year between 1929 and 1941, which can 
be compared with an unadjusted 2.31 per cent per year, calculated directly from 
Table A-XXIII of Kendrick (1961) . With a cyclical adjustment, the newer estimate 
rises to 2.97 per cent per year, as compared with a cyclically adjusted 2.78 per cent 
reported earlier (Field, 2011: 43, 100). Most of the difference between these two 
sets of growth rates is attributable to the faster growth of the chained index output 
series. 
Chained indexes try to resolve the fundamentally unresolvable differences 
between Paasche and Laspeyres quantity indices by taking a geometric average 
of the growth rates from one year to the next calculated using each type of index, 
and then creating a linked series. Chained index methods are better for calculating 
the growth of aggregates over time than the older procedures of sticking with base 
period prices for a number of years, and then switching to a new base year. The 
problem with this approach is that every time a new base year is introduced, the 
calculated growth of aggregates changes, requiring us, in a sense, to rewrite 
periodically our economic history even though the underlying data are not 
changing. 
Although chained index methods are better for measuring the growth of 
aggregates over time, they are not as useful for estimating the relative shares 
of components of the aggregates, since these shares, if calculated using the same 
procedures, will not necessarily continue to sum to the aggregates year after 
year. Since measures of TFP growth involve relationships between the growth 
of aggregates, however, it is appropriate to ask how the use of series not 
Without the stimulus, the decline in state and local revenue, and thus expenditures, would have 
been even greater, and one would have also lacked the benefits of federal infrastructu ral spending 
as well as the weaker support for consumption provided by the tax reductions included in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and such programmes as 'cash for clunkers' . By 20 I l .4, 
state and local spending was 46 per cent higher than federal spending (N IPA Table 1.1.5, accessed 
21 February 201 2). 
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available to Kendrick in 1961 affects the quantitative narrative. I begin with 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts 
(BEA NIPA) Table 1.1.6, available at < http://www.bea.gov/>, which gives 
chained index estimates of annual GDP going back to 1929. 
The aggregate used in Table 12.1 is the PNE, a subset of the national economy 
excluding agriculture and government. The logic of excluding these two sectors 
from studies of long term productivity growth is that the value of much of the 
former (government product) is set at its cost of production, precluding by 
convention any productivity improvement. And output in the latter sector-
agriculture-is often affected by supply shocks (floods, hailstorms, temperature 
changes) that have little to do with improvements in efficiency. Because of these 
exclusions, I need to adjust downward the annual levels of real GDP from NIPA 
Table 1.1.6 so that they correspond roughly to the PNE. 
Kendrick (1961 : 298-300, Table A-III) provides annual estimates not only for 
GDP but also for government and farm product separately. I subtract the latter 
two subtotals from the former to get estimates of the PNE in 1929 dollars, and use 
the ratios of the PNE to GDP in the Kendrick data to adjust the BEA NIPA 
Table 1.1.6 numbers for the entire economy to approximate those for the 
PNE. According to the chain weighted series, 1941 GDP was 39.8 per cent higher 
than the comparable 1929 figure (2.79 per cent growth per year). Using the PNE/ 
GDP ratio from Kendrick as described above to calculate PNE levels for the 
chained index series, I estimate that real output in the PNE was 37.7 per cent 
higher in 1941 than in 1929 (2.67 per cent growth per year). 
I then go to the BEA Fixed Asset Table 2.1 for levels of private fixed assets 
(structures and equipment) during the period 1929- 41. Since Kendrick provides 
estimates of the capital stock for the private domestic economy (1961: 334- 7, 
Table A-XXII; this includes farm output) as well as for the PNE (1961 : 338- 40, 
Table A-XXIII), I use the ratio of the latter to the forme r to adjust the BEA private 
fixed asset data to get estimates of private non-farm chained index capital. This 
series grows very slightly rather than, as had been the case with Kendrick's, 
declining very slightly between 1929 and 1941. Kendrick had PNE capital about 
1.6 per cent lower in 1941 than 1929, while the newer BEA series with the adjustment 
to approximate fixed capital in the PNE shows a small increase (1.5 per cent) over 
the 12 year period. Substituting the newer capital series for the one used by 
Kendrick will slightly reduce calculated TFP growth by slightly increasing the 
growth of the combined input measure. In the calculations that follow, however, 
this effect will be more than swamped by the substantially higher growth in output 
using chained indexes. 
1 then proceed to calculate revised indexes of TFP levels (A) for 1929, 1941 and 
1948. The assumed functional specification of the production function is Cobb-
Douglas, with constant returns to scale: 
Y = AK11N 1- f3 
Y = real output 
N = labour hours 
K = capital input 
Economic Growth and Recovery in the US 
Rearranging, we have 
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Using lower case letters to represent continuously compounded growth rates, we 
have a version of the fundamental growth accounting equation. This equation tells 
us that TFP growth (a) is the difference between output growth (y) and a weighted 
average of capital (k) and labour (n) growth . 
a = y - /Jk - (1 - /J) n 
/3, the elasticity of output with respect to capital, as well as capital's share, is 
assumed to be 0.25, and that ofl abour, (1 - /3), 0.75. These are the shares Kendrick 
assumed fo r 1929-37 (Kendrick, 1961: 285, Table A- 10). He used an even smaller 
capital share (0.23) for 1937-48, but I am assuming most of the small drop in the 
share occurred after the start of the war, and to keep matters simple, use 0.25 fo r 
the entire 1929-41 period. As already noted, because the growth of labour and 
capital input both remain close to zero between 1929 and 1941, changes in these 
weights will make almost no difference in calculated TFP growth rates. 
The PNE TFP levels resulting from these calculations show TFP 35.7 per cent 
higher in 1941 than in 1929 (2.54 per cent growth per year). Recall that real output 
in the PNE was 37.7 per cent higher (2.67 per cent growth per year). Once again, 
almost all of the growth in output can be attributed to TFP growth, not growth in 
inputs conventionally measured. This is not surprising. Since we are using the 
same series fo r labour hours input as did Kendrick, and the capital input series has 
received only a slight upward adjustment, combined private sector input growth 
over the 12 year period is still very close to zero. 
This estimate of 2.54 per cent per year PNE TFP growth is before a cyclical 
adj ustment. The adjustment is based on a regression of differences in logs of 
annual levels of TFP (fl.ln (TFP)) on a constant and the change in the unemploy-
ment rate in percentage points fo r the period 1929-41. The coeffi cient on the 
constant term (0.0306, or 3.06 per cent per year) provides a rough gauge of the 
trend growth rate of total facto r productivity across the Depression years. The 
coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate (- 0.0084, or - 0.84 percent-
age points) estimates how much the PNE TFP growth rate tended to decline (rise) 
if the unemployment rate increased (decreased) one percentage point. 22 The 
econometric specification assumes that fluctuations in the unemployment rate 
(and, implicitly, the output gap) during this period are driven primarily by 
fluctuations in aggregate demand; the hypothesis maintained is that TFP pro-
cycl icali ty is almost entirely a consequence of business cycles, ra ther than their 
cause (see the main body of the chapter). The regression results are as fo llows 
(t statistics in parentheses). 
Dep. Va r. 
fl. ln(TFP) 
Years 
1929-4 1 
11 
12 
Constant 
0.0306 
(3.34) 
fl.UR 
- 0 .0084 
(- 4.01) 
R 2 
0.617 
22 That coefficient is rema rkably stable across the entire period 1890-2004, even though trend 
growth rates have varied substantiall y. See Field (20 I 0a). 
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One way to cycl ically adj ust would simply be to replace the 2.54 per cent with the 
3.06 per cent coeffici ent on the constant in the above regression. I use a related 
procedure that yields something very close to this. Since unemployment in 1941 
was still 9.9 per cent, I ask, in light of the cyclicality coefficient, what the level of 
TFP in 1941 would have been had unemployment in that year been what it was in 
1948 (3.8 per cent). Based on the regression results, the natural log of the 1941 
level of TFP would have been 0.0512 higher (- 6.1 * - 0 .0084) had unemployment 
in 1941 been at the 1948 rate of 3.8 per cent. That also implies that the difference 
in the log level from any ea rlier year would have been 0.0512 higher. Dividing by 
12, this would mean an additional 0.427 percentage points per year added to the 
continuously compounded growth rate measured from 1929 to 194 1.23 Thus, with 
a cyclical adj ustment, the TFP growth rate for the PNE rises from 2.54 per cent per 
year to 2.97 per cent per year. This is the rate reported for 1929- 41 in Table 12.1. 
The cyclical adjustment strengthens my argument about the magn itude of a 
Great Leap Forward between 1929 and 1941. But it is not essential fo r the 
narrative since the dominance of that period stands out even without the adjust-
ment, and, for that matter, even with the somewhat lower unadjusted TFP rate 
calculated directly from Kendrick. No other period in US economic history 
exh ibits a comparable ra te of growth of total factor productivity. 
With the cyclically adj usted level for 1941, we can now also calculate 1941-48 
TFP growth, which comes in at 2.08 per cent per year, close to estimates for the 
golden age (1948-73), higher than that reported in Field (20 11 : 43), but still 
almost a third below the estimated rate of growth for 1929- 41. 
Let us consider now how the use of the chained index numbers affects other 
productivity measures. Using cha ined index output and capital, labour product-
ivity (output per hour in the PNE), grew 38 per cent between 1929 and 1941 (2.68 
per cent per year) . Output per adjusted hour (adjusted hours take into account 
possible changes in labour quality) was 35.7 per cent higher (2.54 per cent growth 
per year). Because Kendrick's implied measure of labour quality grows slightly 
over the Depression years, output per adjusted hour growth is slightly lower than 
growth in output per unadjusted (raw) hours. 
These growth rates are before a cyclical adjustment. Specifying the appropriate 
counterfactual here is trickier than with TFP. We know that labour productivity 
growth is also pro-cyclical, although not as strongly so as is TFP (Field, 2010a). 
We also know, from a rearrangement of the fundamental growth accoun ting 
equation , that labour productivity growth is equal to the sum of TFP growth 
and capital's share times the rate of capital deepening: 
y - n = a + /J(k - n) 
This equation tells us that labour productivity growth (y- n) is affected by two 
influences in principle distinct: technological and organization innovation (re-
flected in the (a) term), and increases in the ratio of physical capital to labour, or 
capital deepening, reflected in the (k - n) expression. Capital deepening results 
when an economy allocates part of its annual GDP to produce buildings and 
23 With the cyclical adjustment, the 1941 level ofTFP would have been 42.8 per cent higher than in 
1929, as compared with the actual 35.7 per cent higher. 
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equipment. So long as gross private domestic investment exceeds depreciation 
(the an nual wear and tear on the existing stock), the physical capital stock will 
grow, and when it grows fas ter than labour or labour hours, the ratio of physical 
capital to labour increases. We say that capital has deepened (k - n is positive) , 
and on this account alone, output per hour should rise. A road construction crew 
using heavy construction equipment should, fo r example, be able to move more 
cubic metres of earth per hour than a crew using pick axes and shovels. The 
transition fro m d igging with shovels to digging with backhoes requires capital 
accu mulation, and its contribution to growth in output per hour is at least 
conceptually distinct fro m a technological or organizational innovation that 
adds to a nation's book of available blueprints. 
We have already calculated that, with the chained index output and capital 
numbers, and under a counterfactual in which 1941 unemployment was 3.8 per 
cen t rather than the actual 9.9 per cent, the rate of growth of TFP between 1929 
and 1941 would have been 2.97 rather than 2.54 per cent per year (0.43 percentage 
points per year higher). Since TFP growth is one of two key in fl uences on labour 
productivity growth, th is cyclical adjustment to TFP, by itself, would contribute a 
similar bump to growth in output per hour. But we also know that capital tends to 
'shallow' in a recovery: the growth of the capital- labour rat io, and quite possibly 
its level, decl ine as one approaches potential output fro m below (in the short run, 
the denominator (labour) grows fas ter than the numerator (capital)) . Capital 
shallowing weakens labour productivity growth during a recovery, partiall y coun-
terbalancing the positive influence of pro-cyclical TFP. From a growth accoun ting 
perspective, this counterbalance is the main explanation fo r why labour product-
ivity growth is more weakly pro-cyclical than TFP growth. 
From a regression of the change in the natural log of the capi tal- labour ratio on 
a constan t, and the change in the unemployment rate over the entire 1890- 2004 
period, we can esti mate the cyclicali ty coefficient for the capital- labour ratio at 
0.0 151: roughly speaking, KIN declines by 1.5 per cent fo r each one percentage 
point decl ine in the unemployment rate (Field, 2010a) . 
Dep. Var 
f'.. ln(KIN) 
Years 
1890-2004 
11 
11 4 
Constant 
0.0163 
(7.53) 
f'..UR 
0.0 151 
(16.70) 
R2 
0.741 
Had the unemployment rate been 6.1 percentage points lower in 1941, we can 
posit that the natural log of KIN would have been lower in that year by 0.092 
(- 6.1*0.0 151 = - 0.092). Dividing this by 12, we conclude that this would have 
lowered the continuously compounded growth rate of the capital- labour ratio 
(KIN) between 1929 and 1941 by - 0.77 percentage points per year per year. Since 
the contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity growth is weighted by 
capital's share, this would have reduced the growth ra te of labour productivity by 
0. 77*0.25 = 0. 19 percentage points per year. 
Summing the effect of the hypothetically higher TFP growth rate (0.43 percent-
age points per year) and the effect of the hypothetically lower (negative) growth 
rate of the capital- labour ra ti o (- 0.19 percentage points per year), we conclude 
that the appropriate cyclical adjustment for the labour productivity growth rate 
between 1929 and 1941 is 0.24 percentage points per year (0.43- 0. 19). Adding thi s 
to our in itial estimate of the growth of (actual) output per adjusted labour hour, 
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we reach a cyclically adjusted rate of growth of output per hour of 2.92 per cent 
per year. Using the hours series that has been adjusted for improvements in labour 
quality we get, using the new output series, a cyclically adjusted rate of growth of 
2.78 per cent. 
This is a striking result, since it tells us that the growth of output per hour 
between 1929 and 1941 was at least as high as it was across the quarter century 
generally viewed as the golden age of US living standard improvements 
(1948-73). It is important contextually in understanding the discussion in the 
second part of this chapter about the growth of real wages during the Depression. 
Finally, let us consider how the introduction of these two new series affects 
calculations of capital productivity (output per unit of capital). Using the new 
capital and output series, adjusted as described to correspond with the PNE, 
we have output per unit of capital rising 35.6 per cent between 1929 and 1941 
(2.54 per cent per year). This is once again before a cyclical adjustment. We know 
that capital productivity is very strongly pro-cyclical (and indeed it is this pro-
cyclicality, even more than the weaker pro-cyclicality of labour productivity, that 
in an accounting sense, drives TFP's strong pro-cyclicality). The regression below, 
for the period 1890- 2004, shows that, while there is no long term trend in capital 
productivity (the constant term is approximately 0, confirming one of Nicholas 
Kaldor's stylized facts about economic growth), a one percentage point decline in 
the unemployment rate typically adds about 2 per cent to that year's growth in 
output per unit of capital (Field, 2010a). This pro-cyclicality is because, when an 
economy comes out of a recession, output grows much faster than physical 
capital.24 
Dep. Var. 
t.ln(Y/K) 
Years 
1890- 2004 
n 
114 
Constant 
0.002 
(0.0061) 
t.UR 
- 0.0200 
(- 14.52) 
R2 
0.654 
Since the counterfactual we have been exploring involves 1941 unemployment at 
1948 levels (3.8 per cent), which is a 6.1 percentage point difference from actual, 
this suggests that had 1941 been at or close to potential, the natural log of 1941 
capital productivity would have been 0.122 higher that year. Dividing by 12, that 
would have added 1.01 percentage points to the continuously compounded 
growth rate of capital productivity between 1929 and 1941, yielding a cyclically 
adjusted rate of growth of 3.56 per cent per year. A check on the reasonableness of 
this calculation can be made through another rearrangement of the fundamental 
growth accounting equation, which tells us that TFP growth must be equal to a 
weighted average of capital productivity and labour productivity growth. (To 
persuade yourself of this, multiply out, eliminate the (3y terms which cancel out, 
and rearrange the remaining terms). 
24 l am approximating the service fl ow from the capital stock by assuming that it is proport ional to 
the stock. For mechanical machinery, depreciati on can be affected by hours of operation or start-stop 
cycles. But mechanical machinery is a small fraction of the fi xed asset stock, the bulk of which consists 
of structures. For the canonical physical capital good-a building-the rate at which a roof wears out, 
or exteri or paint oxidizes, is almost entirely independent of how full or empty it is, or how rapidly 
goods and people move through it. For further discussio n of th is approximation, see Field, 201 0a,c. 
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a = [3 (y - k) + (1 - {J )(y - n) 
Noting that the relevant labour input series in both Kendrick's and my revised 
calculation is adjusted hours (adjusted for labour quality growth), we can deduce 
an implied rate of capital productivity advance (y - k) consistent with our esti-
mates of TFP and labour productivity advance. Since we have already calculated 
cyclically adjusted estimates for a and y - n, these numbers are easily backed out. 
For the 1929- 41 period, this comes in at 3.54 per cent per year, very close to what 
we arrive at using the cyclicality coefficient from the 1890- 2004 regression. 
Output, both actual and potential, grew substantially between 1929 and 1941 
with only minimal increases in private sector physical capital, which is to say that 
the capital to output ratio declined, since the output to capital rat io rose. There are 
other periods in US economic history in which labour productivity grew as rapidly 
as during the Great Depression. There is none in which this was true for capital 
productivity. The uniqueness of this development is brought into strong relief 
when we remind ourselves that there is no long run upward trend for capital 
productivity. 
Making an upward adjustment to the 1941 level of the output to capital ratio 
will of course raise the 1929-41 growth rates, and reduce the growth rate for 
1941 - 48. In this case, the cyclical adjustment lowers capital productivity growth 
between 1941 and 1948 from 3.07 per cent per year ( using the unadjusted level of 
capital productivity in 1941) to 1.34 per cent ( using the adjusted level). As a check, 
the calculation using the formula above relating TFP growth, labour productivity 
growth, and capital productivity growth comes in at 1.36 per cent. 
As already discussed in describing the cyclical adjustment for 1941 labour 
productivity, a cyclically adjusted level for the 1941 capital - labour ratio is based 
on a regression of the log difference of the capital-labour ratio on a constant and 
the change in the unemployment rate in percentage points. The regression shows 
that the capital-labour ratio has risen over the long run at about 1.6 per cent per 
year, but there has also been strong cyclical variation. In particular, as an economy 
recovers, labour input grows much more rapidly than capital input so the capital-
labour ratio falls. Without a cyclical adjustment, the capital- labour ratio in the 
PNE rises very slightly (0.14 per cent per year) between 1929 and 1941. We have 
already calculated that had the 1941 unemployment rate been 3.8 per cent, the 
natural log of the 1941 capital- labour ratio would have been 0.092 lower, which 
would have reduced the annual growth rate of the ratio by 0.77 percentage points 
per year, yielding a cyclically adjusted growth rate of - 0.63 per cent per year. 
With a cyclical adjustment, the ratio then grows at a rate of 1.28 per cent per year 
between 1941 and 1948. We can check on the reasonableness of these calculations 
by observing that the difference between the rate of labour productivity growth 
and capital productivity growth should yield the rate of capital deepening: 
y - n - (y - k) = k - n 
To summarize, the pivotal number in all of these calculations is the TFP growth 
rate for the PNE. Using output, hours, and capital input from Kendrick (1961), 
TFP growth is 2.31 per cent per year, continuously compounded (with a cyclical 
adjustment: 2.78 per cent per year). Using the same hours series, but the newer 
chain weighted output series and the chain weighted capital stock series, we get 
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2.54 per cent per year. A cycl ical adjustment raises this to 2.97 per cent per year. 
These cyclically adjusted growth ra tes approximate, using the di ffe rent data series 
as described, what TFP growth between I 929 and 1941 would have looked like 
had there been no remaining output gap in 1941. A TFP growth rate approaching 
3 per cent per year is unmatched in any comparable period of US economic 
growth, and can be decomposed into a ra te oflabour productivity growth equal to 
or exceeding that reali zed during the golden age, combined with a rate of capital 
productivity growth fa r exceed ing that in any other period. 
Several concerns might be raised about the conclusion , to borrow from the title 
of my 2003 American Economic Review article, that the 1930s were indeed 'the 
most technologically progressive decade of the centu ry'. First, could some of the 
high rate of TFP growth be due to the ramp up in military spending prior to US 
entry into the war in December of I 941? O nly in the sense that, as noted, TFP 
growth d isplays strong pro-cycl icali ty, and increased military spending p rior to 
the war accelerated the closing of the output gap th rough traditional aggregate 
demand mechanisms. Thus the actual growth rate of TFP between 1940 and 1941 
is affected by the narrowing of the output gap associated with war preparations. 
But what is relevant here is not the growth in TFP from 1940 to 1941, but ra ther 
the growth as measured fro m 1929 to 1941, preferably adjusted to account for the 
cyclicality of TFP. 
Still , is it possible that the military build-up prior to Pearl Harbor not only 
helped close the output gap, but also augmented potential output? O ne must keep 
in mind the relative magnitude of what happened before the US entered the war. It 
is true that military manpower and spendin g, including Lend Lease, grew dramat-
icall y from 1939 to 194 1. For example, men in uniform almost tri pled, fro m 
600,000 to 1.8 million. But this is dwarfed by maximum military manpower in 
1944 of over 12 million. The US was effectively demilitari zed du ring the 1930s, 
and military disbursements to the end of 1941 were less than 5 per cent of what 
would be expended cumulatively between 1939 and 1945 (Field, 2003). The 
United States was not fully mobili zed for war until sometime in mid-1942. 
Given these timelines, there is far too littl e opportunity fo r cumulative output 
and learning by doing in war-related production to have generated technological 
and organizational spillovers with enduring impact on the economy's potential 
output (Field, 2011: chapter 3). Thus, it is unlikely that the measure of the TFP 
trend growth rate between 1929 and 1941 is influenced by the military build-up. 
A second concern is whether or to what degree TFP growth might be based on 
improvements in human capital or labour quality. As can be seen from the second 
column of Table 12. 1, which shows the growth of adjusted labour productivity, the 
overall growth of labour quality was modest during the Depression years, and thus 
the numbers fo r output per hour and output per adjusted hour growth are qui te 
similar. Human capital mattered , but the contributions of the rather small number 
(in comparison with the total labour fo rce) of workers in R&D labs was probably 
more important than any general upwa rd trend in the quali ty of labou r. And 
whatever the position one takes on the empirical relevance of selective retention of 
higher quali ty labour in economic downturns (Margo, 199 1), this is simply not 
relevant fo r compari sons between the years 1929 and 1941. Although private 
sector hours were effectively unchanged, because of a reduction in hours per 
person, there were actually 11 per cent more persons employed in the latter year 
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than in 1929 (Kendrick, 1961). Any effect of selective retention that might have 
been in play between 1929 and 1933 would have been more than reversed by the 
rapid growth of the economy and the increase in persons employed between 1933 
and 1937 and again between 1938 and 1941. 
A third concern involves the extent to which these calculations overlook the 
influence of public sector infrastructural investments. Are we, for example, simply 
seeing a statistical artefact, the effect of the substitution of publicly owned street 
and highway capital for privately owned railway capital? Including economically 
relevant public capital, which, unlike private sector capital, did grow over the 
Depression, will, of course, reduce the calculated TFP growth rate, because 
combined input growth will be positive and higher. Recalculating TFP growth 
rates for the last three-quarters of the twentieth century using an augmented 
capital input series that includes economically relevant public sector capital does, 
as expected, show the Depression years with TFP growth rates that are lower than 
those calculated using private sector capital alone. But this dynamic affects other 
periods as well, and 1929-41 still stands out as exhibiting significantly higher TFP 
growth than the 1920s or any of the post-war periods (Field, 2003, 2011 ). 
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